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Questioning authority: Constructions and 
deconstructions of Hinduism 
Brian K. Smith 
QUESTIONING AUTHORITY 
The title of my essay is taken from a well-known bumper sticker, spotted on 
vehicles throughout North America. The sentiment expressed is one that I find 
admirable, although it is practiced by most of us mainly in the breach. As 
scholars, however, questioning authority is one of the principal features of our 
professional enterprise; and for those of us who are scholars of religion, it is, in 
my opinion, the sine qua non of the discipline, t 
First and foremost, it is necessary for each generation to reevaluate the 
authoritative pronouncements of our intellectual ancestors. The self-evident 
truths of the past are perpetually contested and replaced by new 'facts' and 
'better' interpretations and theories. This need not necessarily be positivistically 
envisioned as 'progress' but as an opportunity to reflect upon historical relativity 
and the interestedness of all knowledge. Our new truths, produced out of the 
nexus of current assumptions, interests, and concerns, will also inevitably be 
subjected to the same interrogation, criticism, and overturning by future scholars. 
For those of us in the academy who assume personae as nontheological 
scholars of religion, the mandate to question authority pertains additionally to 
other sets of discourses. Joined to the work of critically examining the assump- 
tions and conclusions of our intellectual forebears, tudents of religious tradi- 
tions are also faced with the task of questioning the bases of authoritative claims 
put forward by the religious themselves. For religions are characterized and 
possibly defined--by the particular kind of authoritative truth claims they make. 
The sources of authority that religions rely upon are not those of the merely 
human, the subjective, or the historically and culturally conditioned. Rather, the 
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appeal is to the supernatural and transcendent, the objectively and absolutely 
true, the timeless and universal. 
Questioning, and indeed countering, such laims to ultimate authority is not 
only desirable but also inevitable in an academic discipline that regards religion 
as a product of human beings, adopts the historical method, and recognizes the 
cultural conditioning and relativity of all religious claims and authorities. 2 
These very methodological principles will entail a description of the object of 
study at odds with the self-description f religion put forward by the religious. I 
agree with Claude Lrvi-Strauss when he writes that 'No common analysis of 
religion can be given by a believer and a non-believer' (1972: 188), although I 
also believe it is possible for a 'believer' to analyze religion from the perspective 
of a 'non-believer' as part of his or her professional stance. 
Things are complicated, however, when scholars of religion ignore or simply 
dismiss certain claims issuing forth from the religious. It is indeed the case that 
the bases upon which religions make their authoritative claims to truth--having 
been acknowledged and described--may nd must be challenged by those of us 
in the academy who make claims to a different sort of truth based on different 
epistemological grounds. On the other hand, it seems problematic when scholars 
of religion arrogate to themselves the authority to decide for religions what does 
and does not count as orthodoxy and religious identity. 
The picture is further muddied by the fact that within any religion there will 
be competing voices, each appealing to supernatural and transcendent sources for 
its authority, and each with varying notions about what is orthodox and who is 
'in' and who is 'out.' Religions are neither monolithic entities, nor are they 
unchanging over time, despite the claims often made for them by their 
theologians. They are rather historically variable, culturally figured and recon- 
figured, and often encompass within themselves a bewildering variety of diverse 
and divergent doctrines, practices, texts, and leaders. Thus, within any religious 
tradition, among different sectarian wings, and even within those sectarian 
wings at any given historical moment, here will be different voices claiming to 
speak authoritatively for (and to) that religion. 
How the scholar of these traditions adjudicates competing claims to authority 
within what is ostensibly a single religion can be vexing. The scholar of 
religion, here again, will necessarily oppose some of the religious authorities he 
or she studies. By privileging one kind of articulation of the religion over 
others, one will inevitably end up opposing and delegitimating other 
authorities. 
Such complex issues of authority and the relations between scholars, their 
discipline, and their objects of study have taken center stage in the contemporary 
study of Hinduism. The issues raised here have important implications for the 
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present and future direction of the general field of religious tudies. The study of 
Hinduism has been making significant contributions to the study of religion 
since at least the nineteenth century, when Friedrich Max Miiller and others 
used Indian data extensively in their formulations of the new disciplines of 
comparative mythology and comparative religion (Religionswissenschaft). 
Recent rends, both in the academy and in India, make it possible that this 
subfield will have continuing impact on the larger discipline, if, and only if, 
both the data of Hinduism and the interpretive thinking issuing forth from 
Indology can be set in a comparative framework. 
In what follows I will attempt o review and evaluate some of the issues 
surrounding one feature of the contemporary study of Hinduism. I concentrate 
here on the conflicts in authority that characterize Indology at present and that 
center around the definitional problem: What is Hinduism? The controversy 
over the definitional contours of this variegated tradition is one that concerns 
conflicts (and alliances) between authorities of different sorts, varying interests 
(sometimes incompatible, sometimes overlapping) driving the different parties, 
and the different consequences (intellectual nd political) each position entails. 
Most of all, it increasingly involves questions as to the role, if any, of 
indigenous (that is, 'Hindu') authorities in the constitution of their own 
religion. 
What is at stake in this issue has implications that spill over into the broader 
field of religious tudies. How is a religion conceived and defined, and who is 
legitimately responsible for doing so? Is the case of the study of that complex 
entity known as 'Hinduism' unique, or is it comparable to issues in the study of 
other 'religions'? 
WESTERN CONSTRUCTIONS AND DECONSTRUCTIONS 
OF HINDUISM 
Many works have recently been published which are designed to contest, 
reevaluate, and deny the legitimacy of categories generated by scholars of the 
past to interpret India. One thinks especially of Ronald Inden's (1990) analysis 
of various Indological received truths; the rise of 'subaltern studies' and their 
challenges to histories written by and for the elites; critiques like Gyanendra 
Pandey's (1992), which argues that communal identities are constructs of 
British colonialism, or Partha Chatterjee's (1986), which similarly posits that 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century conceptions of Indian national and cultural 
identity were foreign in origin and largely imposed on the colonized. 
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It is in this genre that one can assign a whole spate of recent works 
contending that modern articulations of a unified 'world religion' called 
'Hinduism' are nothing more than imaginary representations issuing forth, 
originally, from Western intellectual imperialism (for example, Dalmia and von 
Stietencron 1995; Sontheimer and Kuike 1989; cf. Doniger 1991; Duara 1991; 
Hawley 1991; Hiltebeitel 1991; Larson 1995). In recent years it has thus become 
an ironic, if not paradoxical, truism among many professional Western experts 
of Hinduism that the object of their expertise does not really exist. This 
misleading category of 'Hinduism,' it is argued, must be deconstructed in the 
interests of truth in advertising and atonement for the sins of our Orientalist 
forebears. The Indological authorities of the past created 'Hinduism,' and the 
Indological authorities of the present are now busy disestablishing its conceptual 
existence. 
It is now averred that, in reality, Hinduism is not one religion but many, and 
always has been, as this enunciation of the position forcefully argues: 
There has never been any such a thing as a single 'Hinduism' or any single 
'Hindu community' for all of India. Nor, for that matter, can one find any 
such thing as a single 'Hinduism' or 'Hindu community' even for any one 
socio-cultural region of the continent. Furthermore, there has never been any 
one religion--nor even one system of religions--to which the term 'Hindu' 
can accurately be applied. No one so-called religion, moreover, can lay 
exclusive claim to or be defined by the term 'Hinduism.' The very notion of 
the existence of any single religious community by this name has been falsely 
conceived (Frykenberg 1989: 29). 
The contention here is that 'Hinduism,' as a singular term depicting a mono- 
lithic religion, is a false category that elides the many and variegated differences 
'on the ground' in South Asia. 'Hinduism' should be pluralized---or even 
abandoned altogether--as  term with no real referent: 
More a vehicle for conveying abstract ideas about institutions than for 
describing concrete lements or hard objects, Hindu came to be the concept 
used by people who have tried to give greater unity to the extreme cultural 
diversities which are native to the continent (Frykenberg 1993: 526). 
Others have taken this line of thought even further. Frits Staal has suggested 
that employing the label 'religion' to describe Asian traditions like 'Hinduism' 
is also a category mistake--the result of a misguided and hegemonic move to 
import another Western classificatory rubric to Eastern data. There are, Staal 
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argues, no 'religions' in Asia, but only Asian ritual traditions. While the term 
'religion' might be appropriate when discussing Western traditions (where 
orthodoxy is emphasized), it is illegitimate to apply the term to Asian 'ortho- 
praxic' traditions: 
The inapplicability of Western otions of religion to the traditions of Asia has 
not only led to piecemeal errors of labeling, identification and classification, 
to conceptual confusion and to some name-calling. It is also responsible for 
something more extraordinary: the creation of so-called religions .... Thus 
there arises a host of religions: Vedic, Brahmanical, Hindu, Buddhist, Bon- 
po, Tantric, Taoist, Confucian, Shinto, etc. In Asia, such groupings are not 
only uninteresting and uninformative, but tinged with the unreal. What counts 
instead are ancestors and teachers--hence lineages, traditions, affiliations, 
cults, eligibility, and initiation---concepts with ritual rather than truth- 
functional overtones (Staal 1989: 393; emphasis in original). 
Staal therefore concludes, 'The concept of religion is not a coherent concept... 
and should either be abandoned or confined to Western traditions' (1989: 415). 
Thus, according to some scholars, neither a unified religion called 'Hinduism' 
nor any traditions we can call 'religions' exist in South Asia. Both 'Hinduism' 
and the notion of a 'Hindu religion' are the category mistakes of Western 
intellectual imperialism. Questioning the authority of these categories, it is 
claimed, will retrieve amore authentic view of Hinduism(s) while rectifying the 
Orientalist errors of the past. 
There is certainly a case to be made for this position. As is well known, 
'religion' is a term that non-Western traditions did not have before contact with 
the West. This point is directed not only to state the obvious but also to argue 
that there are no indigenous terms that can properly be translated by the term 
'religion.' 
This line of argumentation was first taken by Wilfred Cantwell Smith, who 
demonstrated several decades ago that the names for particular 'religions'-- 
'Buddhism,' 'Hinduism,' 'Taoism'--are, like 'religion,' of foreign origin. 
'Hinduism' in particular, argues Smith, 'is a concept certainly [Hindus] did not 
have before the encounter with the West' (1962: 63). More recently, Heinrich 
von Stietencron has stated that 'Not only is the term modern...[,] but also the 
whole concept of the oneness of Hindu religion was introduced by missionaries 
and scholars from the West' (1995: 51; cf. Frykenberg 1993: 523). 
Most non-Western 'religions' such as 'Hinduism'--at least as they are usually 
understood today--are the conceptual and discursive products of the historical 
Western encounter with non-Western traditions. As comparative categorical 
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frameworks emerged in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, what Peter 
Marshall and Glyndwr Williams call 'systems of belief' were designated 
'religions'--analogous to the known 'religion' of Christianity: 
When studying other systems of belief eighteenth-century Englishmen applied 
to them assumptions which they held about Christianity. They believed that 
Asia was clearly divided between adherents of distinct 'religions,' which in 
time they were to classify as 'Hinduism,' 'Buddhism,' Taoism,' or under 
some other name. Each 'religion' had, as Christianity was thought to have, a 
fixed body of doctrine stated in sacred writings .... Assumptions that Asian 
religions had distinct identities, formal structures and historical traditions 
akin to Christianity, even if there was a huge gulf between them and it in all 
matters of substance, provided a framework for comparisons. From the 
sixteenth century more and more books appeared in Europe describing 'new' 
religions and comparing them with one another and ultimately with 
Christianity (1982: 98). 
The 'religion' dubbed 'Hinduism" was a product of this time. The very name 
'Hindu' was invented by outsiders, a label conceived and deployed to classify 
(and conceptually unify) a wide variety of inhabitants of the Indian sub- 
continent. The use of the term 'Hinduism' to depict the religion of some of 
those inhabitants i  of more recent vintage and is now said to be the direct 
product of the Orientalist intellectuals working in the colonial period of British 
rule. 3 Under this reading of recent history, scholars from the West created a 
religion comparable to the religions of the West--with canonical sacred books 
(principally the Vedas, but also the Bhagavad GTta and other texts that attracted 
Western attention), a priesthood (the Brgthma.nas), a body of orthodox teachings 
and practices (centering around varn. dgramadharma)---and called it 'Hinduism.' 
Given this reconstruction f history, one of the major impulses guiding the 
move to deconstruct the category of 'Hinduism' comes from the current critique 
of past wrongs perpetrated by Western colonialism and its intellectual ann 
('Orientalism'). From this vantage point, contesting and deconstructing (or at 
the very least pluralizing) the concept and label 'Hinduism' can be understood as 
an attempt o right injustices inflicted on India and Indians as well as an 
intellectual move designed to return a recognition of pluralism and diversity to a 
tradition (or set of traditions) inaccurately portrayed as unified and monolithic. 
It is, from this point of view, an intracultural debate, with the Western 
Indological authorities of the present challenging a category generated by the 
Western authorities of the past. Furthermore, the deconstructive move can also 
be represented as restoring to indigenous India a truer and more authentic 
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version of its own pluralistic and variegated history. Thus the deconstruction f
a monolithic ategory like 'Hinduism' can be portrayed as in the interests not 
only of 'truth' but also of 'authenticity.' For if 'Hinduism' is a category 
imposed on India from the outside, deconstructing it can be represented as a 
restorative move to resurrect indigenous (and multiple) notions of tradition, 
community, and systems of belief and/or practice. 
WESTERN DEFINITIONS OF HINDUISM 
One problem with this depiction of Western understandings of 'Hinduism' is 
that it is difficult to find in the annals of scholarship many conceptualizations of 
Hinduism that conform to the supposed monolithic and essentialist position 
being opposed. 4 Some Orientalists and later Indologists have indeed argued 
for a definition of Hinduism centering around caste, the vam. d~ramadharma 
system, and the primacy of the Br~hma.nas 5 or have identified a set of defining 
'orthodox' doctrines; 6 while others have seen 'Hinduism' as defined, in one way 
or another, as centering around the authority of the Vedas. 7The vast majority of 
Western experts, however, have envisioned Hinduism in precisely the very fluid, 
pluralistic terms that contemporary deconstructionists favor. 
Indological authorities have not usually, contra depictions otherwise, 
constructed a 'monolithic' Hinduism with clear definitional boundaries. Rather, 
statements put forward about Hinduism by Western scholars have most often 
been vague in the extreme. Usually arguing that Hinduism, unlike other world 
religions, has no founder, no centralized authority, no 'church,' no agreed upon 
canon comparable to the Bible, Qu'r~n, Trr~h, and no doctrinal unity, scholars 
have found it difficult to compare such an amorphous entity to the more 
discriminating and bounded religions of the West. 'Hinduism' has most often 
been represented not as a religion comparable to other religions but as a 
peculiarly unbounded and nondescript entity that resists definition altogether. 
The assumed indefiniteness of Hinduism has, in the past, often meant 
conceiving of the religion in metaphorical terms. Hinduism, as Inden has 
noted, has been constituted by Westerners as 'a female presence who is able, 
through her very amorphousness and absorptive powers, to baffle and perhaps 
even threaten Western rationality, clearly a male in this encounter' (1990: 86; 
emphasis in original). Hinduism, according to the great nineteenth-century 
Indologist Monier Monier-Williams, is like an Indian banyan tree whose 'single 
stem sends out numerous branches destined to send roots to the ground and 
become trees themselves, till the parent stock is lost in a dense forest of its own 
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offshoots' (1877: 11, cited in Hawley 1991: 22). Alternatively, Hinduism is 
likened to an excessively fecund and chaotic jungle: 
Hinduism has often and justly been compared to a jungle. As in the jungle 
every particle of soil seems to put forth its spirit in vegetable life and plants 
grown on plants, creepers and parasites on their more stalwart brethren, so in 
India art, commerce, warfare and crime, every human interest and aspiration 
seek for a manifestation i  religion, and since men and women of all classes 
and occupations, all stages of education and civilization, have contributed to 
Hinduism, much of it seems low, foolish and even immoral. The jungle is 
not a park or garden. Whatever can grow in it, does grow. The Brahmans are 
not gardeners but forest officers .... Here and there in a tropical forest some 
well-grown tree or brilliant flower attracts attention, but the general impres- 
sion left on the traveller by the vegetation as he passes through it mile after 
mile is infinite repetition as well as infinite luxuriance. And so it is in 
Hinduism (Eliot 1954, 2: 166-67, cited in Inden 1990: 86-87). 
'Hinduism' by definition, these scholars claim, cannot be defined. It is too 
fluid, too all-encompassing, and, most of all, too 'tolerant' to be subjected 
to a concept like 'orthodoxy' or even 'orthopraxy,' let alone 'monolithic.' 
An articulation like the following, written by J. A. B. van Buitenen (in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica's entry on 'Hinduism,' no less), is not atypical: 
As a religion, Hinduism is an utterly diverse conglomerate of doctrines, cults, 
and ways of life .... In principle, Hinduism incorporates all forms of belief and 
worship without necessitating the selection or elimination of any .... A Hindu 
may embrace a non-Hindu religion without ceasing to be a Hindu (1974: 
519). 
Note that in this articulation one does not even have to be a 'Hindu' to be a 
'Hindu'! Confronted with 'Hinduism,' Western scholars of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries have tended to retreat from, rather than insist upon, 
categorization. It is the other side of the Orientalist heritage--the Romantic 
vision of the 'mysterious East'--that has been dominant as Indologists describe 
'Hinduism.' As one scholar put it, 'Even a superficial acquaintance l aves one 
with the impression that the religious life of India is fascinating, complex, and 
mysterious, but, above all, different from the religious traditions of the West' 
(Younger 1972: 9). Or again, "An approach to Hinduism provides a first lesson 
in the "otherness" of Hindu ideas from those of Europe. The Western love of 
definition and neat pigeon-holing receives its first shock' (Spear 1949: 57). 
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Thus, despite the revisionist history of modern deconstructionists, most 
Indologists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have declared Hinduism 
either too disorganized and exotically other or too complex and recondite to be 
subjected the definitional strictures applicable to other religions and cultures. 
'Hinduism,' we have been informed by the experts in the West, can mean 
practically anything. Indeed it appears difficult not to be a Hindu (see Smith 
1993); 'Hinduism' is an entity so fluid and 'tolerant' as to encompass a variety 
of religions and communities under the shade of its ever-spreading banyan tree. 
It turns out that the contemporary deconstructionist model of plural 
Hinduisms (or no 'Hinduism' at all) is not that far removed from what appears 
to be the standard received wisdom of Indology. If virtually everything counts 
as 'Hinduism' (and this, it would seem, is the dominant Indological model), 
then the term 'Hinduism' means nothing at all (as some of the deconstruc- 
tionists would have it). Many of the Western authorities of the past and the 
Western authorities of the postmodern present hus agree: There really is no 
such thing as a Hinduism, with clearly defined boundaries and definitional 
strictures. 'Hinduism' is constituted, in either case, as different from other, 
more circumscribed religions; it is thus incomparable because it is uniquely 
unsusceptible to definition. The much maligned Orientalists and their later 
Indological successors are, on this score at least, mostly straw dogs. 
QUESTIONING INDIGENOUS AUTHORITIES: 
HINDUS AND HINDUISM 
The move to deconstruct 'Hinduism' is not, it would seem, principally an 
intracultural debate between past and present Indological authorities. For these 
two sets of Western experts tend to be in basic agreement about he entity. If the 
real target of the deconstructionist agenda to do away with the category of 
'Hinduism' is not the mainstream of Western Indological thought, who are the 
authorities these contemporary scholars are really questioning? 
What modern deconstructionists may really be objecting to is the self- 
identification of many Indians as 'Hindus,' adherents of a 'religion' (comparable 
to Christianity, for example, and Islam) called 'Hinduism.' The notion that 
contemporary Western scholars of India are restoring to Hindus some kind of 
precolonial authenticity that was lost as a result of Western machinations i
complicated by the fact that many 'Hindus' now have adopted and utilized the 
very categories that certain modern Indologists wish to reason away. Challenging 
the constructions of Hinduism thus entails contesting the authority not only (or 
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not even primarily) of the Western Indological past but also of indigenous 
Indian authorities who claim to speak for a unified 'Hindu religion.' It is, then, 
partly or even primarily an intercultural debate between the postmodern West 
(and some contemporary Indian intellectuals) and Indian religious authorities. 
The Hindus who do claim and have claimed to speak for 'Hinduism' are, need 
it be said, multiple and various; there are many different 'Hindu' voices, with 
different and various conceptions of the 'Hinduism' they claim to be speaking 
for. But in all cases, the postmodern critique of any monolithic onceptualiza- 
tion of 'Hinduism' has as one of its ramifications to question the authority of 
anyone who claims to speak for a singular 'Hinduism.' 
Who are these multiple indigenous authorities that modern Western decon- 
structionists are also implicitly or explicitly contesting--and delegitimizing? 
One of the principal sets of religious experts that has, for millennia, claimed to 
speak for 'Hinduism' or 'the Hindu religion '8 is the Br~ma0.a pa.n(l, itas, 
theologians, and philosophers. Members of this elite class have portrayed 
themselves as the spokespersons for truth and orthodoxy since at least the 
middle of the first millennium BCE (the time when competing, 'heretical' 
traditions first arose). 9 These Br~thman.as, regardless of sectarian affinities, have 
tended to be fairly clear about what Hinduism is and what a proper Hindu 
should believe and practice. Their vision of Hindu orthodoxy is of course 
extremely self-serving: a Hindu is one who accepts the authority of the Vedas 
(texts composed, preserved, and interpreted by Br~ahma0.as), follows the 
particular prescriptions for him or her in the vam. agramadharma scheme (in 
which the Br~hma.na class has placed itself at the top of the hierarchy), and 
accepts the Br~hman.a class as the supreme arthly authorities on 'religion.'J° 
While 'not a creedal religion in the same sense as Christianity,' Br~ahma0.a 
pan d. itas for thousands of years have 'nonetheless understood Hinduism to 
have a doctrinal core, deviation from which would mean ceasing, at least 
intellectually, to be a Hindu' (Young 1981: 140). 
The authority of the Veda was particularly singled out as the hallmark of 
orthodoxy in Br~hman.ical formulations. In Dharma texts the Veda is declared 
'unquestionable' (amTrnam. sa; Manusmrti 2.10-1 i), and those who deny its 
authority are reviled (12.95). Other authorities, from the Mim~.ms~kas to 
Safikara, have insisted upon acceptance of the authority of the Veda as the 
defining criterion of orthodoxy, and virtually all sects usually thought to be 
'Hindu' have, in one way or another, paid at least lip service to the notion that 
they are all somehow linked to the Veda and the Vedic past (Smith 1987, 1989: 
13-29). Unqualified adherence to the authority of the Veda is 'the thread' that 
has united Bi'~hman.a polemics and apologetics 'in spite of differences in space 
and time' (Young 1981: 135). 
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Insofar as Western Orientalists and Indologists did conceive of a 'Hindu 
religion' with real definitional contours, it was largely on the basis of what 
this class of learned Br~hma.nas told them about the tradition and its unifying 
principles. Europeans did not invent the notion that the Veda was the 'holy 
book' of Hindu India, or that caste was the defining religious and social 
institution, or that Br~hma0.as were the authoritative l aders of the tradition. 
They were, at least in part, representing the Sm~rta Br~hma0.a view of things. 
While the exact configuration of 'Hinduism' as a 'religion' was certainly shaped 
(how could it be otherwise?) by the culturally and historically conditioned 
expectations of Westerners of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
raw materials for such a reshaping were readily supplied by traditional Br~hman.a 
informants. 
Conversely, when confronted with missionaries and Orientalists and made 
aware of the categorical expectations of these Westerners, Br~dama0a p n.d, itas 
had no difficulties in drawing upon traditional discourse and redeploying it in 
the terms of Western debate (see Dalmia 1995; Young 1981). In this way, 
Br~thma0.a authorities, albeit now in a dialogical or dialectical relationship with 
Westerners, continued to act as spokesmen for a unified 'religion,' now known 
by the term 'Hinduism' (or its Sanskritized equivalents, for example, hinda 
dharma). 
Deconstructing the concept of 'Hinduism' is thus, in part, a move to delegiti- 
mate the authority of certain Br~hma0.a pan. d. itas and theologians to pronounce 
on what 'Hinduism' is. I myself have argued (Smith 1994: 314-25) that certain 
claims Brahman.as make for the Veda and for the constitution of the class and 
caste system in which they have given themselves a privileged position must be 
contested.~l It is, however, another matter to deny the theologians of a tradition 
the legitimacy to pronounce on what constitutes 'orthodoxy' and what exactly 
lends the tradition its conceptual unity. 
In fact one could argue it is precisely the theologians of a tradition who 
construct (and continually reconstruct) the principles that allow for a category of 
self-identification like 'Hindu.' Jacob Neusner has recently argued that 'the issue 
of theology bears consequence because upon the result, in the end, rests the 
question of whether we may speak of a religion, or only of various documents 
that intersect here and there' (1995: 239). The theologians of a tradition provide 
the 'glue' to an otherwise disparate set of data, 'facts,' sectarian differences, and 
all other particularities: 
The conception of 'Judaism,' or 'Christianity,' or 'Buddhism,' serves the 
purpose of holding together in a coherent philosophically harmonious and 
proportionate construction diverse and otherwise inchoate facts, e.g., writings, 
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artifacts of material culture, myths and rites, all of them, without distinction 
as to provenance ororigin, deemed to contribute to an account of one and the 
same systematic omposition, an -ity or -ism; and, further, all of them-- 
beliefs, rites, attitudes and actions alike--are assumed to animate each 
(Neusner 1995: 239). 
Questioning the authority of theologians to do what theologians do----create a 
doctrinal umbrella underneath which the particularities of any religious tradition 
are organized--seems a bit presumptuous. One may nevertheless wish to do so 
in order to decenter t aditional sources of authority, to represent the interests of 
competing voices within the tradition that have been disregarded or silenced 
(discontents or 'heretics'). But there is certainly no reason to single out the 
theologians of Hinduism. Such an enterprise, if set into motion, should be 
directed equally at all of the 'religions.' Buddhism,' Christianity,' 'Islam,' 
and 'Judaism' are all, at least in part, the conceptual products of their 
theologians? 2 'Hinduism,' from this point of view, is hardly a unique case, a 
point to which I will return below. For now I would argue, however, that if 
we as students of religion decide it is incumbent upon us to decenter the 
theological authorities of the religions we study, we should be mindful of the 
ethical and intellectual consequences of such interventions. We should carry out 
this self-appointed task in our study of all religions and not just a selected few. 
Religions do of course change over time; and the conceptualizations of 
any particular religion will inevitably be altered by history. The contours of 
modern indigenous (that is, 'Hindu') views of 'Hinduism' have also undergone 
such change, especially in light of the interactions Hindus have had with the 
West. Traditional Brfihma0ical views of Hinduism have themselves been 
adapted to the new conditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, 
more importantly, have been joined by other modernized (and, to some extent, 
'Westernized') indigenous visions. It is with two other sets of Hindu authorities 
that have arisen in the wake of this intercultural encounter over the past two 
centuries where this kind of adaptation to modernity is most visible: the so- 
called 'Neo-Hindu' reformers, and the Hindu nationalists. 
Scholars who contest the monolithic conceptualization f 'Hinduism' regard 
the Neo-Hindu movement as something like the native shadow of the Orientalist 
project. For it is in the formulations of 'Hinduism' issuing forth from such 
various nineteenth- and twentieth-century reformers like Aurobindo, Day~manda 
Sarasvati, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Rammohun Roy, and Vivek~nanda that the 
impact of the Western ideas is most obvious. 13 
The Neo-Hindu indigenous authorities are often dismissed as 'inauthentic,' 
their claims to legitimacy compromised by their encounters with modernity and 
Questioning authority / 325 
Western social, political, and intellectual trends. Their representations of
'Hinduism' are delegitimized as merely the native restatement of ideas 
originating in the West. As Paul Hacker writes: 
Neo-Hinduism is not a unified system of ideas. In fact it is chiefly because of 
one common trait that I classify religious thinkers as Neo-Hindus. Their 
intellectual formation is primarily or predominantly Western. It is European 
culture, and in several cases even the Christian religion, which has led them 
to embrace certain religious, ethical, social, and political values. But 
afterwards they connect hese values with, and claim them as, part of the 
Hindu tradition (1978: 582). 
More recently, Gerald Larson haslisted the Neo-Hindus as the only indigenous 
source for contemporary Indian ideas about Hinduism and religion, but he 
also characterizes the movement they led as a 'defensive reaction' to outside 
forces: 
Modern Indian notions of religion derive from a mixture of Christian (and 
mainly Protestant) models, Orientalist and largely Western reconstructions of 
India's religious past, and nineteenth century indigenous reform movements 
most of which were defensive reactions against he onslaught of Westerniza- 
tion and Christian missionizing (! 995: 5). 
Questioning the authority of the Neo-Hindu version(s) of 'Hinduism' seems to 
presuppose precisely what it also wants to argue against: that there is indeed 
some kind of 'authentic' or 'genuine' tradition or group of traditions (called 
Hinduism?) that has been compromised by those who have adapted to new 
historical, cultural, social, and political circumstances. The 'syncretism' attrib- 
uted to Neo-Hindu formulations of 'Hinduism' assumes its opposite--a 'real' 
and 'unadulterated' Hinduism (or a variety of 'real Hinduisms') that existed 
before the encounter with the West and was previously unaffected by historical 
change and intercultural and interreligious forces. 
All religions, at various points in recent history and under varying circum- 
stances, have adopted to the modern word and the accompanying intellectual 
trends of modernity. 'Hinduism' (or 'Neo-Hinduism') is not unique in this 
regard either; the Neo-Hindu movement shares many commonalties with 
developments in other eligious traditions around the world over the past several 
hundred years. The study of religion is the study of traditions in constant 
change. The reforms of the nineteenth and twentieth century in Indian religion 
are no different in principle than the transformations that have occurred 
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throughout the history of 'the tradition.' While it is necessary to the scholarly 
task to attempt to track such historical change and also to contest he claims of 
ahistorical continuity put forward by the religious, another form of 'essentialism' 
occurs when one period of change is somehow constituted as a deviation or 
inauthentic swerve from some supposedly more or less timeless norm. 
The specific contours of the 'Hinduism' put forward by the Neo-Hindu 
movement are indeed attributable to the historical, cultural, and political 
circumstances of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century India (including the 
presence of Western colonialism and intellectual imperialism). And while one 
can argue that a 'monolithic' vision of newly conceptualized 'Hinduism' arose 
out of these circumstances, it is important to note that the Neo-Hindus, by and 
large, 14 constructed a vision of their religion no less open-ended than the 
definitions put forth by the mainstream of Indology. 
The 'Hinduism' portrayed by Neo-Hindus--tolerant, universalistic, all- 
encompassing, and nonsectarian--was created in part to represent i  as the 
unifying agent in the nationalistic struggle. Confronted with both the reality of 
diversity and the British political critique of Indians as hopelessly divided, ts 
'Hinduism' (or its essential core, VedAnta) was conceived and put forward as an 
all-encompassing mechanism of spiritual, cultural, and national unity. In fact 
many Neo-Hindus went even further, declaring that Ved~mtic philosophy was 
not part of a religion or even a religion in and of itself but 'religion' in general; 
all religions could be incorporated under the umbrella of Ved~.nta. Thus, 
Vivek~nanda would assert that 
Ours is the universal religion. It is inclusive enough, it is broad enough to 
include all the ideals. All the ideals of religion that already exist in the world 
can be immediately included, and we can patiently wait for all the ideals that 
are to come in the future to be taken in the same fashion, embraced in the 
infinite arms of the religion of the Vedanta (1970-73, 3: 251, cited in 
Halbfass 1988: 238). 
Somewhat later, Radhakrishnan would similarly write (again using the term 
'Ved,~ta' for the essential heart of 'our religion'): 'The Vedanta is not a 
religion, but religion itself in its most universal and deepest significances' 
(1968: 18, cited in Halbfass 1988: 409). 
While traditional Br~ma0.a authorities were the sources for one kind of 
Western definition of Hinduism, the Neo-Hindus--acting out of their own 
interests and propagating their own agenda--were dialectically creating another 
version of 'Hinduism' with another, and much more dominant, branch of 
Indology. Neo-Hindu articulations of Hinduism provide us with the Indian side 
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of the same coin, stamped with the mainstream of Indological views of the 
tradition. Hinduism, in both cases, is not a religion comparable to others. The 
all-encompassing, pluralistic nature of the beast defies definition--it either is 
incomparable to other eligions or was 'religion' itself, the summary and 
supersession f all 'religions.' 
Hinduism, it is claimed by both Neo-Hindus and Indologists, can be and is 
virtually everything. But for the Neo-Hindus, this nondefinition of Hinduism 
has played a different role than it has for Western scholars. The latter have, it 
would seem, resisted definition out of befuddlement, atavistic notions of a 
'mysterious East' that defies rational categories, or simply failure of will; the 
former have done so largely out of concerns revolving around cultural pride 
and nationalistic aspirations. And, in either case, the end result is not dissimilar 
to the recent deconstructionist critique: There really is no such thing as 
'Hinduism,' if by that term we mean a tradition that is both unified and 
bounded. 16 
The third set of native authorities that is challenged by contemporary 
deconstructionists is comprised of the Hindu nationalists, commonly called the 
Hindutva movement. Originating at about he turn of the twentieth century, this 
movement has recently undergone quite a revival and has become a major factor 
in modern Indian politics. Perhaps even more than traditional Brahman.as and 
Neo-Hindus, it is the Hindu nationalist authorities and their pronouncements 
about Hinduism that many contemporary scholars have challenged by denying 
the existence of either a 'Hinduism' or a 'Hindu community.' 
Romila Thapar, in a widely cited article (1985), has argued that the Hindutva 
movement is creating a new form of 'Hinduism' out of the pluralistic and 
variegated realities of the Indic subcontinent. She has labeled this monolith 
'syndicated Hinduism,' formulated in reaction to the historical encounter with 
Semitic religions: 
The new Hinduism which is being currently propagated by the Sanghs, 
Parishads and Samajs is an attempt to restructure the indigenous religions 
as a monolithic, uniform religion, rather paralleling some of the features 
of Semitic religions. This seems to be a fundamental departure from the 
essentials of what may be called the indigenous 'Hindu' religions (Thapar 
1985: 15). 
Pointing to its modern origins in the Neo-Hindu movement and to the 
important contributions made to it by Indians of the Hindu diaspora, Thapar 
characterizes this new form of Semiticized and synthesized Hinduism as a 
movement that 
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draws largely on Brahmanical texts, the Ggta and Vedantic thought, accepts 
some aspects of the Dharmashdstras and attempts to present a modern, 
reformed religion. It ends up inevitably as a garbled form of Brahmanism 
with a motley of 'values' drawn from other sources, such as bringing in 
elements of individual salvation from the Bhakti tradition, and some Puranic 
rituals. Its contradictions are many. The call to unite under Hinduism as a 
political entity is anachronistic (1985: 22). 
Finally, concludes Thapar, this new 'Hinduism' was created 'for purposes more 
political than religious, and mainly supportive of the ambitions of a new social 
class' (1985: 22). 
Others have also criticized the Hindu nationalist movement on both 
these scores; that it is replacing pluralism and diversity with a monolithic 
('syndicated,' 'organized,' 'Semiticized') form of Hinduism, and that it is not 
really a religious movement at all but, in essence, a political one (see, for 
example, Duara 1991; Jaffrelot 1993; Lochtefeld 1996). The academic effort to 
deconstruct this monolithic and politicized version of Hinduism has often been 
portrayed as in the interests of protecting those who have been victimized by the 
Hindu nationalist movement: 
It appears to me that by rediscovering and accepting Hindu religious plurality 
as one of the characteristic features of Indian culture, the tensions which at 
present cause conflicts between the so-called Hindus and the so-called non- 
Hindus could be reduced considerably ( on Stietencron 1995: 79-80). 
But, as with the early Neo-Hindu movement, he Hindu nationalists do not 
seem to be constructing a new 'monolithic' form of the Hindu religion which 
is, as one critic puts it, 'contrary to the pluralistic and hierarchical essence of 
Hinduism' (Jaffrelot 1993: 522). Rather, driven by aspirations to spearhead a 
mass movement among India's diverse 'Hindu' population, the Hindutva leaders 
have been concerned to formulate a version of 'Hinduism' that is as inclusive, 
and vague, as possible. 
Hindutva authorities have studiously avoided definitional statements about 
what 'Hinduism' qua a 'religion' really is. 'Hindutva' itself is an intentionally 
ambiguous term, implicitly referring to the religion of Hinduism while explic- 
itly constituted as having only a 'cultural' referent. This ambiguity is obviously 
a strategic political move. For by actually defining Hinduism in terms of, for 
instance, allegiance to the authority of a 'canon,' the authority of the Brahrna0a 
class, or the doctrines and practices associated with va.~gramadharma, Hindu 
nationalists would lose elements of the mass movement they wish to lead. 
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Many 'Hindus' do not actually pay much attention to the Vedas; southerners 
resent he imposition from the North of Sanskrit and texts written in that 
language as definitive of 'Hindu' identity; and, the vast numbers of those 
historically persecuted by the religiously sanctified caste system will balk at 
any definition of 'Hindu' that relies on Br~hma.na privilege or its ideological 
underpinnings, varn. gtiramadharma. Both 'Hindutva' and 'Hinduism' have been 
deployed by Hindu nationalists as mobilizing slogans (and have been effective 
as such) and not as clearly defined religious terms. 
While the movement has certainly drawn upon the religious sentiments 
and resentments of many sectors of the 'Hindu' populace, their definitional 
statements have thus tended to be as religiously vague as they are politically 
charged. 'A Hindu,' proclaimed Hindu nationalist Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 
the 1920s, 'means a person who regards this land of Bharat Varsha [that is, 
India], from the Indus to the Seas, as his Father-Land as well as his Holy-Land, 
that is the cradle of his religion' (1942: 1). Those who do not consider India as 
their 'Holy-Land' (for example, Muslims and Christians) are regarded as 'guests' 
by some Hindu nationalists. 'The non-Hindu people in Hindustan,' wrote 
R,~.s.triya Svayamsevak Safigh leader Madhavrao Golwalkar, 
must learn to respect and revere Hindu religion, must entertain o idea but 
that they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country wholly 
subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, 
far less any preferential treatment, not even citizen's rights (1939: 47-48). 
The Hindutva movement is not so much constructing a new 'syndicated 
Hinduism' as it is drawing upon and exploiting old notions of Hinduism as 
indefinable qua a religion and redeploying such notions to reposition Hinduism 
as the defining cultural and political ideology of India. It is, arguably, the 
absence of clear scholarly definitions of what constitutes Hinduism--as one 
religion among others in the subcontinent--that s made possible the discourse 
of Hindutva. Both Neo-Hindu and Indological traditions that have represented 
Hinduism as fundamentally different from other religions--in its infinite 
capacity to subsume all other religions within it--have left a legacy with new 
and perhaps unexpected consequences in the rise of Hindu nationalism. 
The Hindu nationalist movement has also been criticized for being not 
'religious' at all but a purely political movement that merely exploits religious 
sentiment for political ends. Delegitimizing Hindutva authorities thus also 
entails representing them not as religious leaders but as misguided and 
dangerous politicos. The assumption here seems to be that there is an essential 
'religious' or 'spiritual' dimension of religions like Hinduism and that 
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introducing a political dimension somehow sullies that essence. This portrait 
ignores the fact that religion has always had a political dimension. While the 
nationalistic form this political element within religions has taken in recent 
times is, of course, historically and culturally conditioned, challenging the 
Hindutva authorities because their version of Hinduism has a political 
component is not persuasive. Criticizing the Hindutva movement for being 'too 
political,' and therefore not inclusive of genuine 'religious' spokespersons, can 
carry with it assumptions about religion that are idealized and decontextualized 
from the historical and cultural realities in which religions always function. It 
may also have unfortunate r sonances with Orientalist presuppositions regarding 
a 'spiritual India' that is, in essence, apolitical and ahistorical. 
Scholars have obligations, in my opinion, to contest some of the claims put 
forward by the Hindutva movement, especially when such claims appropriate 
the language of science, archaeology, and history (Smith 1996). Scholars of 
Hinduism might also object to the kind of representations Hindutva uthorities 
are putting forward as to what constitutes 'Hinduism.' Doing so effectively, 
however, will involve providing alternative definitions of Hinduism as a religion 
that cease to imagine it as uniquely incapable of definition and therefore 
incomparable to religions elsewhere. 
The history of modern 'constructions' (and 'deconstructions') of Hinduism, 
both in India and in the West, seems to demonstrate that all such representations 
have had a stake in portraying this religion as more or less indeterminant, 
unbounded, pluralistic to the point of all-embracing--as, in other words, 
distinct and different from other eligions. The indigenous authorities who have 
been seriously challenged are not the Neo-Hindus or even the Hindu 
nationalists, both of whom tend to rework basic Indological assumptions about 
Hinduism. Rather, it has been the traditional BrAhma0as and their authoritative 
pronouncements--in which one finds clear statements of definition regarding 
Hinduism as a religion, which also provide the means for constituting 
Hinduism in a way comparable to other religions--who have been the losers 
over the past several centuries of Western and Indian interaction. 
THE STUDY OF 'HINDUISM' AND 
THE STUDY OF RELIGION 
The issues surrounding the current debate over the definitional contours of 
Hinduism could have important ramifications for the study of religion in 
general. But if they are to do so, scholars of Hinduism must relinquish the 
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time-honored notion in this field that our subject matter is, for whatever reason, 
exceptional. The definitional problem in the study of Hinduism is, I would 
argue, comparable tosimilar problems confronted by scholars of other eligions. 
The set of concerns I have concentrated upon here---those surrounding 
'Hinduism' as a descriptive and/or interpretive term, competing sources of 
authority for depicting this religion, and the relationship of religious self- 
identification to categories used in the academic study of religion--is by no 
means confined to the Indian situation. While there are obviously specific 
circumstances that surround these problems in terms of the study of Hinduism, 
the issues are similar to those faced elsewhere. 
That 'Hinduism' was 'constructed'--by Orientalists, Neo-Hindus, Hindu 
nationalists, separately or in concert--is not some kind of epistemological 
revelation, nor is it a historical anomaly, nor is it a feature common only to this 
entity. One might equally, and with as much validity, argue that all such 
designations for world religions are 'constructs.' As Larson notes, 'These 
designations are for the most part little more than conventional labels .... Each is 
a singular label disguising what is in reality a pluralist away of cultural 
traditions' (1995: 31). 
The postmodern effort to destabilize the essentialistic dimensions of various 
terms and concepts (for example, 'Hinduism') can easily end up in a logical 
regress ad infinitum, ending in pure atomism. Swamped by the recognition 
of historical, cultural, social, and even individual particularities, one can 
eschew general categories, throw up one's hands, and declare that a label like 
'Hinduism' is nothing more than an artificial construct with no referent and no 
'hard' or 'concrete' reality. Other traditions too--even those with more obvious 
traditional authoritative sources of self-definition than in the case of Hinduism 
--are, as Larson points out, 'pluralistic arrays of cultural traditions'; and 
concepts like 'Hinduism' are after all concepts. 
Recognizing such pluralism and the conceptual nature of such labels, 
however, does not necessitate he abandonment of scholarly general categories 
that lend meaning to 'naturally' disparate data. Other scholars of other traditions 
have also faced this problem; one of them concludes, after consideration of 
whether one can speak of 'Judaism' or only of 'Judaisms,' that the road to 
unbridled pluralism leads to a philosophical dead end: 
So there is no possibility of claiming there never was, nor is there now, such 
a thing as 'Judaism,' but only 'Judaisms.' For once we take that route, there 
will be no 'Judaisms' either, but only this one and that one, and how we feel 
from day to day, and this morning's immutable truth and newly fabricated 
four-thousand-year-old tra ition (Neusner 1983: 235). 
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Description of particularities logically entails and is followed by acts of 
interpretation, of 'making sense' of the data; and this latter inevitably involves 
comparison, that is, the deployment of general categories and classificatory 
schemes of similarities and differences. General categories provide, as Marshall 
and Williams noted for previous constructions in the age of 'discovery' (and 
colonialism), a 'framework for comparisons' ( ee above, p.318). Such classi- 
fications that are 'constructed' and used by scholars, like 'Hinduism,' are 
themselves comparable to the genus of which they are species. 'Religion,' as 
Jonathan Smith has noted, is a category produced by an 'act of second-order, 
reflexive imagination which must be the central preoccupation of religious 
studies' (1983: 217). What Smith writes about 'religion' can easily be applied 
to the even more specific ategory of 'Hindu' and 'Hinduism': 
That is to say, while there is a staggering amount of data, of phenomena, of
human experiences and expressions that might be characterized, by one 
criterion or another, as religious--there are no data for religion. Religion is 
a creation of the scholar's tudy. It is created by the scholar's imaginative acts 
of comparison and generalization. Religion has no independent existence 
apart from the academy (1983:217; emphasis in original). 
It is important--and in the nature of things--for scholars to continually debate, 
challenge, and revise the 'imaginative acts of comparison and generalization' 
that spring forth from our studies; it is crucial that we continually question the 
authority of our predecessors in the effort to refine our categories. In the Indian 
case we may well decide that, upon reflection, 'Hinduism' is a category in need 
of revision, replacement, or dispersion into other categories. But if the study of 
Hinduism is to contribute to the study of religion, the grounds on which we 
make such determinations should be applicable lsewhere; and if we abandon the 
category of 'Hinduism,' on what new grounds can we compare that which was 
formerly known as Hinduism to other 'religions'? 
As the material presented above demonstrates quite clearly, however, scholars 
of religion do not exercise their authority to write about religion(s) in a vacuum. 
Indeed, the case of Hinduism points to the quandaries we face as scholars when 
confronted with the claims of those who act as representatives of the religion we 
are describing, interpreting, and comparing. While it is certainly not appropriate 
simply to reproduce the religious discourse of religious people, can the 
authorities and adherents ofa religion be disregarded in the scholarly enterprise 
of description, interpretation, comparison, and generalization? 
One of the principal ramifications of the trend in Indology to deny the 
existence of a unified religion called 'Hinduism' is to delegitimize those in 
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India who, in varying ways, have represented themselves as 'Hindus' and their 
religion as 'Hinduism.' Such indigenous representations are, in the extreme 
forms the deconstructionist effort has sometimes taken, cavalierly dismissed 
out of hand. Von Stietencron, for example, has recently declared that it really 
does not matter if 'Hindus' today claim to be followers of a 'religion' called 
'Hinduism': 'The Indian acceptance of the term "Hinduism" cannot serve to 
prove the existence of a "religion" called Hinduism' (1989:15). 
This kind of indifference to indigenous conceptualizations of self-identity is 
one unfortunate end result of the argument that Indology and Orientalist concerns 
singlehandedly 'constructed,' 'invented,' or 'imagined' a unified religion called 
Hinduism. This position is especially problematic in an age where Western 
scholars often claim to be concerned to allow the 'natives to speak' and 'assume 
agency' over representational discourse. Since the publication of Edward Said's 
Orientalism (1979), it is usually not regarded as advisable to blithely ignore or 
overrule the self-portraits of those 'others' under study. In a post-Saidian era, we 
claim to take seriously native voices and thus counter Karl Marx's pronounce- 
ment (reproduced as one of the epigrams of Orientalism): 'They cannot represent 
themselves; they must be represented.' 
Excluding indigenous representations of Hinduism is, ironically enough, one 
implication to be drawn from Said's postmodern master narrative itself. For, in 
that work, Said overstated the hegemonic power attributed to the discourse of 
Orientalism: 'Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a 
sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world' (1979: 40; emphasis in 
original). The overweening power and dominance granted to the West and its 
discourses reappear in many critiques of Indian nationalism, communalism, and 
religion (for criticisms of this tendency and alternative views, see Irschick 1994; 
van der Veer 1994). Here, as in the prototype, the argument fundamentally 
comes down to this: The West invented such notions as 'the Orient,' 'India' qua 
modern nation-state, 'Hindus' qua a communal group, and 'Hinduism' qua 
world religion; the East subsequently passively accepted these false notions; 
and, now we (often, but not always) Westerners need to deconstruct them for 
you Easterners (and for ourselves). This vision of the relationship between West 
and East, and between modern scholarship and its object of study, is 
unfortunately reduplicative of such relations in the past. 
Denying the legitimacy of any and all 'Hindu' representations of Hinduism 
can easily crossover into a Neo-Orientalism, whereby indigenous discourse is 
once again silenced or ignored as the product of a false consciousness delivered 
to it by outside forces or as simply irrelevant to the authoritative deliberations 
of Western Indologists. While there are many reasons for scholars to feel 
uncomfortable with the claims some Indians have and are making regarding 
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'Hinduism,' it is perhaps equally dangerous to deny them the legitimacy to 
declare what, for them, is 'Hinduism.' 
Hinduism, construct or no, does indeed exist now, if not in the 'scholar's 
study' then certainly in India and elsewhere where 'Hindus' reside, albeit 
in varying configurations. Trying to deconstruct it in learned books and 
articles is very likely a rear-guard activity, with little chance of success and 
questionable purpose (compare the conclusions of Hiltebeitel 1991). We ignore 
the 'Hinduisms' that do now exist at our own peril; in the absence of scholarly 
definitions and constructs, members of the real world will and have filled the 
vacuum. Perhaps the time has finally come in Indological circles not to abandon 
the concept of 'Hinduism' but to refine and define it as a religion among and 
comparable to others and to do so in consort with selected traditions and 
authorities within Hinduism that have also represented it in such a manner. 
Notes 
i. I am indebted to Bruce Lincoln for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this article. 
2. For a concise statement of method in the study of religion, see Lincoln 1996. 
3. 'Hinduism' is also the byproduct of a British colonial administrative decision 
to divide up the populace into various 'communities' defined by religion-- 
Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and so on (see Frykenberg 1987; Pandey 1992; Thapar 
1989). 
4. I leave aside consideration of early missionary accounts of 'Hinduism' 
that often did indeed tend to portray it as a 'religion,' albeit a 'false' one. The 
general category, 'heathen,' for all 'false religions' was eventually specified to 
'Brfihman.ism' or 'Hinduism' to depict the principal 'false religion' of the Indic 
subcontinent (see yon Stietencron 1995: 73-77). For a survey of the definitional 
problem, see Sharma 1986. 
5. For example, 'The acceptance of the caste system was considered by the 
orthodox to be the sole effective criterion of whether one was or was not a Hindu' 
(Zaehner 1966: 8; cf. DharampaI-Frick 1995; Inden 1990: 49-84). 
6. For example, san.~sdra, karma, mok.sa. 
7. See, for example, Renou's declaration that the Veda 'is precisely the sign, 
perhaps the only one, of Indian orthodoxy' (1965: 2). I have also argued for such a 
definition of 'Hinduism,' although the definition put forward is relational rather 
than essentialistic: 'Hinduism is the religion of those humans who create, perpetu- 
ate, and transform traditions with legitimizing reference to the authority of the Veda' 
(Smith 1989: 13-14, see also 1987). For the importance of the Veda in self-defini- 
tions of Hinduism among Br~hma0a pologists of the early nineteenth century (and 
the traditions they stood on), consult Young 1981: 131-35, 140, 152. 
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8. It may be granted that in traditional and largely Sanskritic texts these are not 
the terms used. It is, however, debatable at the very least as to whether Sanskritic 
terms like 'sandtana dharma" and 'vaidika dharma" cannot, with the proper 
concessions to historical, cultural, and ideological specificity, be comparable to and 
translated as 'Hinduism' or 'the Hindu religion.' Conversely, terms like 'bauddha 
dharma,' found already in 'Hindu' texts dating from before the Common Era, might 
very well be adequately translated as 'the Buddhist religion.' 
9. As noted above, many modern scholars of 'Hinduism' deny that the tradition 
has, or ever had, a sense of either 'orthodoxy' or 'heresy' (see also Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1987: 37). For medieval material concerning one sect's distinctions 
between itself as 'Hindu' and others who were not in the fold, see O'Connell 1973. 
10. Such definitional criteria have also entered into modern Indian law, where 
many cases have arisen that require the court to make judgments about who is and is 
not a member of 'Hinduism' (see Baird 1993; Smith 1993). 
11. On the grounds that such claims, like others made in religious discourse, 
depend on acceptance of superhuman, transhistorical, and universalist arguments 
that contravene the methodological principles we must follow as nontheological 
scholars of religion 
12. They are also, of course, the conceptual and discursive products of outsiders 
who have (as in the case of Hinduism) likewise constructed a unity out of religious 
diversity and given it a unified label. These two types of unifying projects--theolo- 
gians working from within; and scholars, administrators, missionaries, and other 
agents working from without--often have significant overlaps. In the Indian case, as 
we have seen above, Orientalist scholars and others built their constructions of 
largely following the same lines used for millennia by the 'orthodox' Br~hman.a 
pan d. itas. 
13. Their emphasis on a 'golden age' of the Vedic past and the degenerate state of 
the Hindu present; a 'return to the Vedas' movement, accompanied by a shift from 
traditional notions of what Daniel Gold (1991) has called 'scriptural authority' 
to a more circumscribed vision of 'scriptural canon' as a way to recover pristine 
'Hinduism'; the abolition of image worship and various ocioreligious practices 
(caste abuses, child marriage, sati) as 'non-Vedic'; the reinterpretation f traditional 
concepts and practices to accommodate modern, Western notions of individualism 
and social service; the organization of the group along Western lines; and, most of 
all, the nationalistically driven agenda to unite 'Hindus' under the banner (usually) 
of Neo-Ved~ntic philosophy--all of these reforms, innovations, and adjustments are 
seen as driven by and derivative of the West. 
14. Exceptions can be made for groups like the ,~rya Sam~j who tended to eschew 
the all-inclusive universalism of other Neo-Hindu groups and can be seen as the 
direct precursors to the Hindu nationalist movement of the twentieth century. For a 
comparison of Day~nanda Sarasvati and the Arya Sam~j, on the one hand, and the 
Rfi.s.triya Svayamsevak Safigh, on the other, consult Gold 1991. 
15. And therefore not a 'nation' and in need of foreign rule. 
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16. Neo-Hindu nationalistically driven universalistic claims for 'Hinduism' (as all 
religions in one) have had interesting reflexes among modern Indologists. Critical 
of attempts, indigenous or foreign, to conceptualize Hinduism as a religion with 
clear boundaries (that is, as exclusive), some of the latter have found themselves 
saying things like 'There is no religion in South Asia which is not, in some sense, 
Hindu' (Frykenberg 1993: 549) or 'The alternative to Hindu nationalism is the 
peculiar mix of classical and folk Hinduism and the unselfconscious Hinduism by 
which most Indians, Hindus as well as non-Hindus, live' (Nandy 1983: 104). 
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